Transformations over Time or Sudden Change: Historical Perspectives on Mass Migrations and Human Lives

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"In times of economic crisis" banker-made and deregulation-induced: Migration is a problem, multiculturalism a failure. And politicians and other talking heads are in a scramble for scapegoats – targets for popular wrath and fear.

Crosscutting thoughts and questions: Europe in the world

Globalization, in the early 1960s happily touted by Marshall McLuhan as all humankind interconnected in a "global village," was trumpeted by pundits in the 1990s as absolutely new, never seen before – and a threat to the highly developed West.¹ Scholars, at least those of world history, agree that "globalization" emerged five centuries ago with Europeans' new capability to cross the Atlantic, then the Indian, and finally the Pacific Ocean. At that juncture, "discovery" in older parlance, seafarers from the respective rims had travelled the Indian Ocean and East Asian Seas for two millennia. And, in transcontinentalizations, the Asian-African-European and the separate North-Central-South American worlds had each been internally connected by webs of caravan routes. Migrations were integral parts of these exchanges. As long as Europeans, "whites" in another categorization, moved outbound, perhaps 60 million of them from the 1840s to the 1940s, migration was constructed as a civilizing mission targeting "lesser" peoples, not white in the common colour scheme that looks at the surface, at skin, and overlooks capabilities,

emotionalities, and spiritualities. As long as this colonizer-power imposing globalization was profitable to Whites in the North Atlantic World it was considered positive. At the turn to the 21st century, with some or many perceiving it as detrimental to economies and peoples in the Atlantic World, it is presented as insidious and subversive of "the West" – once the industrialized West, no the services-needing West.

Migrants, in the 1960s recruited as guestworkers – not as citizens – and as braceros – not as people with, beyond arms, heads and hearts – were a mainstay of the white North Atlantic World's economic development. As profit-yielding producers of surplus value, they were invited. Since the economic slowdowns and crises they have been labelled foreigners who exploit "our" social security systems, arrive without papers – our kind of papers, are illegals and, thus, criminals. Some are also terrorists. – Let us remind ourselves: Wherever colonizing Europeans went, they arrived without papers, exploited local resources, and were heavily armed with an ideology of white and Christian superiority destructive of minds and with guns destructive of lives. As to terrorizing: Vasco da Gama burnt a ship with Muslim pilgrims returning from the hajj to South Asia to sow fear and extort trading concessions; the Spanish, beyond the inadvertent dissemination of Eurasian germs, annihilated millions of Natives in the Americas by warfare and forced labour; the British, in the opium war against China, acted as the largest drug-pushing cartel in the world; Belgium’s King Leopold terrorized the peoples of the Congo region. Today’s migrants may come without papers which is an offence or a misdemeanour, not a crime; only a miniscule fanatic-fundamentalist segment is armed. While the vast majority of Europeans heading for the colonized segments of the world wanted to

force others to work for them, most of today's northbound migrants today want to work themselves for a living.

The sequence of deep crises, touted as reason why migrants should no longer be admitted, began when a mega-company, the then 100 percent US-owned Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), to boost profits, engineered the oil-crisis of the 1973; involved subsequent other crises; and most recently the near collapse of the world economy caused by imperial banks "too big to fail" or, in actor terms, by greed of a few hundred derivative bankers, incapable of understanding their own mathematical trading formulas. It would have been standard legal procedure to sequester the culprits rather than to criminalize and marginalize migrants. They Wall Street and City traders (and a few others) surpass in impact the 19\textsuperscript{th}-century state-built empires, while migrants' only impact their own lives, the economic sector in which they create value, and the society in which they live. Europe's people, over the centuries, have lived through a sequences of elite-made major crises: the trans-Central European Thirty-Years-War, 1618-1648 (80 years in the case of the Dutch struggle for liberation from the Spanish-Habsburg yoke); the trans-European wars, 1792-1815, of the reactionary anti-revolutionary coalition of bloodline dynasties and imperialist Napoleonic stratagems; the war 1914-1918, in which the axis powers relied on forced migrant labourers from East Central and Eastern Europe and the colony-owning Allies relied on forced labour migrants from afar; the Great Depression, 1929-39; and the World War 1937 to 1945. In the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Europe's political and economic elites made the continent the major refugee-generating segment of the globe. Placing Europe in global context, it needs to be emphasized that in 1937, when hundreds of thousands were fleeing fascism, Japan's invasion of China generated one hundred 100 million refugees in that single year.
None of these crises were the responsibility of migrants or dislocated residents; none "erupted" volcano-like as received language usage has it, all were men-made, gendered. The present one, in which trade in derivatives was more explosive than any conventional weapons, according to 2009 ILO data could result in some 18 million men and women loosing their jobs (exclusive of those who become more vulnerable) and 200 million in developing countries are being pushed into extreme poverty.\(^3\) Compared to the 9/11 crisis which cost the lives of 3000 men and women this seems to spur only limited security measures – measures to secure peoples' basic survival.\(^4\)

Crises and migration are closely related. Whether as small as a local famine or as large as the recent "high-class thieves"-engineered one,\(^5\) are threatening of life-projects and often reduce family food intake below levels of physical survival. Most of the tens of millions of Europeans in the delayed 19\(^{th}\) century, 1815-1914, left because they or their families did not have enough to eat, saw few chances to improve their situation, or faced low and further deteriorating standards of living. It made no sense to stay where family investment into reproduction of labour power and raising of children was higher than any income that might be gained from waged rural or urban work. This frame of hopelessness is the rule in segments of many impoverished migrant-sending societies today. Such impoverishment, more often than not, stems from global terms of trade rather than lack of local resources. Europe's 19\(^{th}\)-century "free" transatlantic migrants, like the "free" south-north migrants in the present, move from severely constraining economic regimes to others with more perceived options, from


\(^4\) The first 9/11, the 1973 bombing of the presidential palace in Chile by reactionary army officers with U.S. support, has never received as much attention.

"known impossibilities to unknown possibilities."\(^6\) The white Europeans moving before 1914 had no need for entry documents. The "invention of the passport," a series of entry paper requirements elaborated by nation-states in the Atlantic World from the 1880s but mainly from World War One into the 1920s,\(^7\) created barriers and the "undocumented" category, renamed "illegal" in recent exclusionist discourse, was institutionally invented. To these stateside legal barriers, the nation-ideology added a cultural one: other-cultured newcomers were categorized as "aliens" with lesser rights. "Entry requirements" could also be a proxy for "not of correct colour of skin."\(^8\) Nation-states demanded cultural assimilation and their historians inscribed a newly invented blood-line or genetic continuity into the resident nationals' collective memory. At the turn to the 20\(^{th}\) century, Germanization, Austrianization, Russification, and Americanization drives and, at the turn to the 21\(^{st}\) century, the hate-campaigns against cultural pluralism are products of nationalism. The past's anti-Semitism has become the present's anti-immigrantism.

*Geographies of migration: translocal, transregional, transnational, global*

In public discourses, migrants are characterized by state/ culture of origin, "Turks in Germany" or "Algerians in France." This provides both ascriptions and suggests the role of states in migration either by admission regulations or by economies that push people out. This language usage, first, does not permit reflection of processes of acculturation: from Turkish immigrants in West Germany via Turkish-German to Germans of Turkish cultural background. Second, it unquestioningly assumes migration to be primarily between states as

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\(^8\) In dynastic states, migrants, esp. if coming in groups, could negotiate entry and, often, aid for re-settling and establishing themselves to become producers and taxpayers – the model-case are the Huguenots. Once they had accepted (usually by oath) the new ruler they were "subjects" like other residents and could keep adjust culture and language at their pace.
a whole. Data have never supported such discursive constructions. "Indians" in "Great Britain" are men and women from particular regions and localities of origin and they go to specific municipalities in England. So did people from German-language Central Europe in the 19th-century United States and Canada. Geographies demand differentiation, the permeability of state borders demands emphasis.³

To escape from the "nation to ethnic enclave"-approach of traditional and culturally conservative migration studies, the concept of "transnationalism" has been introduced in the early 1990s and has quickly become a catchwords.⁴ The authors, anthropologists, studied U.S.-bound migrants from the Philippines and refugees from U.S.-supported dictatorships in Latin America. They overlooked the many languages spoken in the Philippine regions, islands, cities and hinterlands; they overlooked that in Central America, many Native People had not even been accorded status of "nationals." Rather than trans-national trans-state crossings of borders occurred, a distinction that is central to analysis since "nation" is a cultural category and "state" one of political institutions. The two concepts are not congruent: Nations privilege cultural majorities over cultural minorities (the latter term a 19th-century invention of gatekeepers of the nation), democratic states – in theory – treat each and every person as equal before the law.⁵

⁴ It also has an almost century-long history: Patel, Kiran Klaus, Nach der Nationalfixiertheit. Perspektiven einer transnationalen Geschichte (Berlin: HU Berlin, 2004). Again a historicization is called for: the concept of transnationalism had actually been used since the 1910s, as Nancy Foner, renowned historian of migration from Caribbean societies to New York, has pointed out under the somewhat exasperated title: "what's new about transnationalism?" Steven Vertovec has commented on the term's "conceptual muddling". However, because of narrative historians' disdain for analytical categories they have been slow in availing themselves of the concepts' analytical potential. A sophisticated version has been explicated by social scientists like Thomas Faist and Canadian scholars Lloyd Wong and Victor Roudometof.
Research, without exception, shows that migrants move between localities and regions rather than whole states and societies. Around 1900, 94% of the U.S.-bound migrants from Europe's many regional cultures, according to their declarations at Ellis Island, headed for kin and friends; so did southern Chinese migrants moving to the Southeast Asian diaspora; and so do African migrants to France or Britain in the present. They come from a particular location of socialization in a specific regional economy and arrive in a delimited social space where trusted acquaintances know that jobs are available. They may migrate to a state with a particular institutional setup but do migrate options to earn their living in local labour markets. Such specific connections are embedded in regions in which young people are socialized into a regional economic frame and migratory practices. Nation-state generated data have not only hidden these specifics, they have also eliminated women from the data since they were considered without agency of their own and thus mere "associational migrants."  

Thus, empirically and analytically, migration researchers study translocal and transregional movements in the context of nation-state legal frames, if only since their establishment towards the end of the 19th century by states. Nation-state narratives are often no more than gatekeeper-produced stories – but with a deep impact on acceptance or rejection of migrants and their cultural expressiveness. "Barbarians," we need to remind ourselves, were – and seemingly are – those of another language, those who could not communicate with the hegemonic culture. Interaction in the streets, on shopfloors, and at other meeting places between resident (national) and in-migrant (non-national) men or women could reinforce

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or challenge national tales and resulting ex- or inclusionary practices. To combine the empirically sound translocal and transregional with the – when appropriate – transnational or transstate, the over-arching term "transcultural" designates the range of options at different levels of social spaces.

A "Transcultural Societal Studies"-approach combines empirical data with interpretive theorizations. If culture is a complex system that includes tools, spoken and body language, arts and beliefs, created by humans beings – in gendered versions – who must provide for their material, emotional, and intellectual needs in order to survive and is acquired in the process of childhood socialization, then transcultural capability denotes the competence to live in two or more cultures and create border-crossing cultural spaces. Strategic transcultural competence involves conceptualizations of life projects in more than one society and choice between options. Transculturation is the process of individuals and societies to change themselves in contact zones by negotiating diverse lifeways into a dynamic plural new whole which, transitory like all societies, will be changed by subsequent interactions and new migrants' input. People, resident and migrant alike, proact according to life-plans, act out their life-projects or, at a minimum, react on a day-to-day basis to circumstances within the limits of monocultural, non-migrant capabilities or multiple capabilities acquired in more than one location. Such societal cultural spaces are located within structures and institutions of a polity – the fixed, if evolving, aspect, but, when crossing an international border, people move into another society with dynamic norms, discourses, and practices. In cases of problems – fundamentalist impositions, constraining job-markets, or explosive racism – the structural fault-lines and hitches in transculturation projects need to be addressed. Any imposition of borders by exclusion, labelling, confining slow
down interaction and acculturation. Politicking creates problems that policy-making might avoid.¹³

Scholarly analysis requires attention to both whole lives and complex cultural and institutional settings. Ideal-type Transcultural Societal Studies integrate the study of society and its patterns and institutions ("social sciences"), all types of representations of it ("discursive sciences"), and the actual practices ("lifeway or habitus sciences") in the context of legal, religious, and ethical norms ("normative sciences"), the somatic-psychic-emotional-spiritual-intellectual characteristics of individual men and women ("life sciences") and the physical-geographic context ("environmental sciences"). They analyze "becoming", the historical dimension, with "being" in the present, and aspirations, the projects for the future – and thus include not only a gendered but also an intergenerational approach.¹⁴

The local and regional, as non-Eurocentric world systems approaches have made clear, need to be connected to global economic and political hierarchies and interconnectedness. The division of the world in a colonizing and a colonized segment since decolonization has been replaced by a colour-coded global apartheid in which the wealthier, whiter populations live off underpaid labour in poorer countries with workers of colours-of-skin other than white.¹⁵ Such working men and women may assess the structural known impossibilities at the location and evaluated options at the location were the products of their labour, Europe or North America, are sold. What does an exploited women, sewing clothes for "the

¹³ The concept of transculturation emerged from Latin American and Canadian scholars' work from the 1930s to the 1950 but in scholarship of the hegemonic core of production of knowledge and interpretive discourses concepts of assimilation to national cultures (Chicago School of Sociology) by "uprooted" migrants (Oscar Handlin, Harvard) remained dominant.

¹⁴ For an elaboration see Dirk Hoerder, "To Know Our Many Selves Changing Across Time and Space": From the Study of Canada to Canadian Studies (Augsburg: Wißner, 2005), slightly revised as "To Know Our Many Selves": From the Study of Canada to Canadian Studies (Edmonton: Athabasca Univ. Press, 2010), Ch. 14.

West" in a factory on the Thailand-Myanmar border, think while doing her work for consumers in wealthier European societies?

Most of this local-global-local summary of actual and past migrations may seem to have lacked attention to gender. However, the – or perhaps "our" – implicit association of the term "migrant" with men, especially in labels like "transatlantic proletarian mass" or plantation belt "coolie" migrations, is and always has been wrong. Past migrations involved men and women, the "proletarian" transatlantic ones in a gender ratio of 60 to 40 to the 1920s and 50 to 50 since the 1930s. The present so-called "feminization" of migration reflects the shift from industrial to service economies in the wealthier segments of the world, not a sudden new presence of women. The designation also reflects that women increasingly account for more than half of the total migrants and that, in the frame of family economies as well as individual life-projects, more women leave first given the structure of labour markets and job options at potential destinations.16

Transcultural Migrant Agency in Global Perspective: Options, Otherness, Gender

While 19th-century, assumedly male migrants, have been said to go to "unlimited opportunities" – the billboard slogan of U.S. manifest destiny ideologues, today's migrant women are often considered victims and numerous studies have substantiated exploitation and harassment.17 However, this paradigm ascribes passivity to those designated as victims. African slaves, who certainly were victimized, in Brazil and the Caribbean still built vibrant cultures, if under extremely constraining circumstances. If all Filipina domestics and caregivers are

16 Studies of present-day domestics and caregiver migrations have become legion since the 1990s – most written by women scholars while men continue to work more on industrial, allegedly male migrations. An attempt to summarize this research is Dirk Hoerder and Amarjit Kaur, eds., Proletarian and Gendered Mass Migrations: A Global Perspective on Continuities and Discontinuities from the 19th to the 21st Century (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming 2011).
victims of a capitalist service economy imposed by rich societies, how could they create social spaces of their own in Hong Kong or Rome?

To capture migrant agency, scholarship needs to focus on individuals. The rupture of mothers leaving children behind to support them from afar, is lived individually and in families. In many societal contexts, individual actions and strategies include a migration habitus and supportive translocal networks. The global financial crisis has exacerbated the constraints imposed on life-plans massively. Migrant strategies in the frame of constraining structural and racial-ethnic-gender ascriptions may be analyzed, as Christiane Harzig has argued, under the concept of "Otherness as cultural resource." Just as whiteness is being analyzed as a resource, for migrant domestic and caregiving workers "foreignness or otherness is one of the most substantial and tangible aspects of socio-cultural capital." In a dialectical relationship, being different permits both entry into a segment of a foreign country’s the labour market – the migrants’ goal to be achieved – and their exploitation, a consequence to be avoided, if in any way possible. Migrants sought and seek entry into receiving societies’ specific and limiting labour market segments as pathway to a society as a whole that in the future, after they have established a base through hard work, will provide better options than the society of birth. Women service workers, excluded from standard immigration entryways, seek (perhaps degrading) jobs as stepping stone for improved lives for themselves and their families. They "are hired precisely because they carry a different cultural baggage."  

The migrant’s interest in entering a society with more options matches the employer's interest in finding a (foreign) worker for tasks which, under the conditions offered, native men or women refuse to take. For receiving societies,

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19 Industrial employers sometimes bore the cost of recruitment and travel to obtain a reliable labour force; domestic workers often receive help from sympathetic employing women in negotiating bureaucracies and in language acquisition.
this otherness hides the intra-societal hierarchy of class. For the migrant women, cultural difference permits "to situate herself outside [culture …] which inevitably places her at the bottom. She may take recourse to the knowledge about her own social position at home and to her being essential [through remittances] to the family's survival. She may also have a strong sense about her own culture's superior food habits and child rearing practices." Women need such resilience because: "The race-class-gender systems of 'importing' cultures (North America, Europe, the Middle East) provide for ready access to stereotypes in order to structure and organize historical 'knowledge' and present 'experience.' Cultural markers are attached to the women." In Italy, for example, women from the Philippines are considered suitable for caretaking and more qualified household work since they are Catholic and speak Spanish or English (in addition to Tagalog) while Somali women (being black and coming from Italy's former colony) are considered inferior.20 Employers were and are aware of women's resilience and often label them as too independent or unruly.21

Migrants move to labour market segments in societies – nowhere are all jobs open to them – in most of which they do not compete with native-born workers because these shun their country's 3-D sector (dirty, dangerous, and often degrading work) or because in "their" segment the receiving country's education and training systems cannot meet demand (software programmers and nurses, for example). Their labour in market segments to which Otherness provides access and in which they – though all domestic work is labelled in male-societal

20 The preceding paragraphs on "otherness" follow closely, sometimes near-verbatim, Harzig, "Domestics of the World (Unite?)," but are adapted (even in case of quotations) to allow for the comparison with 19th-century migrations. For a case study see Victoria Chell, "Gender-Selective Migration: Somalian and Filipina Women in Rome," in Russell King and Richard Black, eds., Southern Europe and the New Immigrations (Brighton, 1997), 75-92.

21 In the cultures of the Eastern Mediterranean, Lebanon and Egypt, and of the Gulf states, migrant women's position is often extremely difficult – because of multiple discriminations due to gender ascription, religion, colour of skin, language, cultural background to name only some. Ray Jureidini, Criminalization and Human Rights of Migrant Domestic Workers Under the Kefala System during Peace and War in the Middle East, unpubl. paper presented at the Intl. symposium "The Global Migration Systems of Domestic and Care Workers Conference," Toronto, Nov. 2008.
categorization as "unskilled" – are highly skilled. From their income the migrant women support the part of their families staying behind. Are they sending money home? "Home" is a highly debatable ideological construct: In Salman Rushdie's words, home may not only be an uninteresting place, it may also be unsafe, unfair, and unjust as well as characterized by discrimination and violence against women. A women migrant whose "home" was a tradition-reinforcing religious community once tersely noted, "there were no bars or visible exits."

Those who depart and send remittances permit their economically marginal family to stay – they aid brothers, sisters, parents to avoid having to migrate. Ideally, remittances even help to consolidate family status and thus reduce migratory potential in marginal economies or economic sectors – the very goal of exclusionists in receiving societies. Nationalists have decried sending of remittances as detrimental to the economy of the host – or increasingly host-ile – society in which the migrants live. Such dead-end thought never mentions the other side of the economics of migration: Each and every migrant, man or woman, arriving in working age, transfers his or her human capital to the receiving society and often adds social capital. Since the society and family of birth invested into upbringing and education, the host/hostile society receives such capital infusion for free and, in addition, receives taxes from people on whom it never spent a cent for education and training. In economic terms, migration is development aid of lesser developed to more developed societies. Migrant labour and taxes are integral to the economics of receiving societies across the globe, remittances – in addition to the individual and family function – help avoid collapse of whole sending states' economies: a stop of remittance arrival in Mexico, the Philippines, and Bangladesh would lead to state bankruptcies which, in turn, would lead to skyrocketing migration propensity.

Agency of migrants has been central for states unable or unwilling to provide options for sustainable lives. Europe's states of the 19th and early 20th century
and many decolonized ones in the present are neither citizen-based ("sovereignty of the people") nor protective of citizens (human rights principles) – they have been and are labour-force exporting states, setting target level for annual departures in the present or, like Great Britain in the past, adding export people considered costly to the state bureaucracies, unmarried women, orphaned children, disabled former soldiers. The receiving states, too, do not live up to the fundamental tenet of an equal citizenry: Labour migrants, with few exceptions, are classified bureaucratically as persons of lesser rights or, even, as of lesser value.

**Conclusion**

Crises slow down migration: those even further impoverished lack the transactions costs of migration, those who may move will often wait for better labour market conditions. In the transatlantic migrations each downswing in the U.S. economy was followed by a decline of in-migration from Europe. Crises may also accelerate migrations – those lacking jobs or even daily sustenance may see no other option but to struggle to reach societies "richer" than their own. If only part of the 200 million poor further precarized by casino capitalism's wrecking ball, through television, watch the amounts of food and luxury in the "first world," it makes sense to join those societies, difficulties along the route or lack of entry papers notwithstanding. Western investors migrate to China because they expect better returns on their investment capital, common people migrate to better job opportunities in Europe to achieve better returns on their human capital.

Though emphasis is on the 2008 crisis, a comprehensive transcultural, historically informed analysis discerns an ongoing and deepening global crisis: By 1995 the gap between the wealthiest and poorest countries of the globe,
compared to 1960, had doubled: the richest 20 percent of the world's population were almost 60 times better off than the poorest 20 percent. This chasm continues to grow.

The colour barrier in migrant admission, abolished in North America in 1962 (Canada) and 1965 (U.S.) and breached in Europe by reverse colonial/post-colonial migrations, has been reconstructed through global terms of trade as "global apartheid." After decolonization, the independencies, in many cases, have not created conditions that permit sustainable lives. Global racialization strategies of restricting access to worldwide natural resources or specific countries' social resources cannot be countered by building a new "iron curtain" along the U.S. southern border or a barrier along the Mediterranean. Annually two million or more men and women - sometimes with their children - migrate internationally, but not always south-to-north, to countries with more perceived options. In many migrant-receiving societies – and, take note of connotations: these are migrant-needing societies – discourses of fear of the Other are instrumentalized to detract from analyzing and improving root causes of migration. The decades-long antagonistic spectre of the "Free West", the communist bloc, is gone and thus, another "clash of civilizations" needs to be invented – Islam is targeted. Samuel Huntington – among many others – obliged with politics of identity: "who are we"? Is Western – German, French, U.S.-American – identity so brittle, so vague, or so undefinable that a devilish internal enemy – once witches, now multiculturalism, gypsies, Mexicans – is also needed to keep it from falling apart. Is an outer wall rather than internal achievement the glue (or the straight-jacket)?

As scholars we may reveal obstacles to migrant women, men's, and children's participation; as politically active citizens we may increase their access to societal resources; as beneficiaries of global inequalities – I argue – we have a mandate to do so.